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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF CANCER SCREENING
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Screening for cancer or cancer risk is well-established in high-income countries. This article considers ethical 
aspects of cancer screening. Ethical evaluation of screening depends on a contested evidence base, interacts 
with people’s fear of cancer, and their enthusiasm for technology in general and screening in particular. Cancer 
screening is both a clinical and a public health activity, and so the often-conflicting frameworks from both clinical 
ethics and public health ethics are relevant to its evaluation. Cancer screening is an intrusion by health services into 
the lives of well individuals and so requires strong justification. Cancer screening can and should prevent harms 
to physical health, but its ability to do so is contingent on many factors and finely balanced; screening can also 
affect psychological wellbeing. When communicating about screening programs, care must be taken to support 
rather than undermine the autonomy of people considering participation. The benefit offered by cancer screening 
programs should be large enough to justify the opportunity costs of screening and the consequent cascade 
of intervention. Treatment should be offered in a way that avoids creating financial strain for individuals. Other 
relevant ethical issues include equity of opportunity and outcome in screening and accountability to communities. 
It is not clear how population-level and individual-level outcomes and interests in cancer screening should be 
balanced; future work should focus on resolving these difficult issues.
Screening for cancer or cancer risk is well-established in 
high-income countries. In Australia this includes organised 
population-based screening programs for breast cancer, 
cervical cancer risk and colorectal cancer risk. In addition, 
prostate specific antigen (PSA) testing to detect prostate 
cancer risk in asymptomatic men is done so frequently 
that it has become a de-facto screening program. This 
article considers ethical aspects of cancer screening. 
Screening is the application of a test (which for practical 
reasons must generally be affordable and easy to use) to 
large, normal-risk populations of asymptomatic people – 
people who appear to be well. This testing is generally 
initiated by health authorities rather than individuals. 
Screening aims to separate people at higher risk from 
those at low risk. Higher risk people then receive diagnostic 
testing, and treatment if disease is present.1,2 
Ethics addresses the question of what, in any given 
situation, is the right or good thing to do, and why those 
actions are more justifiable than alternatives. An ethical 
evaluation of cancer screening is an analysis of whether 
screening for a particular cancer in a certain way is the 
right thing to do, and if so, why. 
Ethically-relevant contextual issues 
An analysis of the ethics of cancer screening occurs in a 
context: it depends both on the evidence about screening 
and on the culture in which screening occurs. 
Screening is usually not initiated by the person 
being screened
In ordinary clinical medicine, a patient approaches a health 
professional seeking resolution of a symptom or problem. 
In contrast, in screening, health authorities encourage 
apparently well people to be tested, an act that may turn 
them into a sick patient.2 This intrusiveness suggests the 
need for a strong justification for screening programs - 
perhaps stronger than for treatments for symptomatic 
disease. 
Ethics depends on evidence, but evidence 
is contested 
Ethical evaluation depends on good evidence, in this 
case, epidemiological evidence about the benefits and 
harms that screening offers. Unfortunately, the evidence-
base for even for the best-established programs is 
contested.3-5 It has developed in disparate contexts, and 
its coherence and generalisability is often unclear. Experts 
disagree on the quality of studies and potential screening 
harms are often not studied. These uncertainties hamper 
ethical evaluation of screening programs.4
Public perceptions and cultural meanings interact 
with moral judgements   
Perceptions about cancer can affect people’s moral 
judgements about screening. Cancer is an especially-
feared disease, strongly associated with death.6,7 
Screening offers a solution to the problem of cancer 
led by technological development, which may increase 
its appeal.8,9 There is general enthusiasm for cancer 
screening. A US study found that 87% of respondents 
believed screening was almost always a good idea 
and 32-41% believed that an 80 year-old who did not 
participate in screening was irresponsible.10 (Note that an 
80 year-old would not ordinarily be screened for cancer: 
the investigators asked this question to test how strong 
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respondents’ commitment to screening was, even in the 
absence of the possibility of benefit.) In an Australian 
study, 80% of participants believed early detection saved 
lives most or all or the time, and 70% wanted to be tested 
even for a cancer that could not be effectively treated.11 
This combination (frightening cancer, high-tech solution, 
enthusiasm for screening) may make people generally 
vulnerable to misperceiving cancer risk, or to taking 
up offers of unproven screening tests, and suggests a 
heightened responsibility for those who offer screening to 
healthy populations.3
Ethical issues in screening activities 
Both clinical ethics and public health ethics are 
relevant to screening 
Cancer screening is both a public health and a clinical 
activity.2 It is ‘public’ in that it is used as a tool to improve 
the health of the general population, supported by public 
funds, organised into national programs that include 
public communication campaigns, and is standardised 
(e.g. the target group, the test used, the quality of 
pathology or radiology services). Although organisation 
varies enormously between jurisdictions,12 the resulting 
standardisation and improvements in service quality 
are important potential shared benefits of organising 
screening. This ‘public’ character of screening programs 
suggests that frameworks for public health ethics are 
likely to be relevant.13 Public health ethics frameworks 
emphasise values and principles such as: reasoning 
at the level of the population, working for common 
good, maximising utility through effective interventions, 
distributing opportunities or outcomes fairly, acting in 
ways that promote trust in the health system (e.g. 
communicating honestly, facilitating public participation), 
ensuring that interventions are necessary and proportional 
to the problem, and avoiding coercion or restrictions on 
important liberties.14-18
Conversely, screening is frequently implemented in clinic-
like situations, either by a person’s usual primary care 
physician as exemplified by PSA testing and cervical 
screening, or by a specialist technician in the case of 
mammography. The choice to participate in or refuse 
cancer screening is largely a matter for individuals. Unlike 
vaccination, where high participation is needed to sustain 
herd immunity, there is little common good arising from 
an individual’s participation in cancer screening. Thus 
the concerns of clinical ethics, such as avoiding harm 
to individuals and respecting the decision of individuals 
about whether screening is in their best interests for 
example, are also relevant.19-21 
This ethical tension is not yet resolved. It seems likely 
that the public aspects of screening programs should be 
assessed according to public health ethics criteria and 
the clinical aspects according to clinical ethics criteria. 
How we should adjudicate if these come into conflict - 
for example, if seeking informed consent to participate 
decreases population-level mortality benefit or program 
cost effectiveness - is not clear. 
Cancer screening should protect physical health 
and avoid physical harm 
Preventing harms to physical health is the stated goal 
of most screening programs. Each Australian cancer 
screening program, for example, takes as its aim: “to 
reduce illness and death from [the relevant] cancer.”22 
However, screening alone cannot prevent harms to 
physical health (that is, prevent morbidity and mortality 
from cancer). This relies on the cascade of diagnostic 
testing and treatment that follows screening.23,24 This 
cascade can prevent harms that would have been caused 
by cancer. But it can also cause physical harm, such as 
pain, disfigurement or functional deficits (for example, 
impotence and/or incontinence after prostate biopsy and 
treatment). If cancer could be reliably detected, and if all 
cancers inevitably and linearly progressed to death, and 
if early treatment was always more effective than later 
treatment, the harms of the screening cascade would 
readily outweigh the harms of cancer.25 Unfortunately, 
benefits and harms in the cascade are often delicately 
balanced. 
Screening and the resulting cascade will be more likely to 
do net harm under the following conditions: 
1. When test characteristics are poor, so that large 
numbers of low risk people are directed to diagnostic 
testing and/or treatment.4,26 
2. When treatment for later, symptomatic disease is very 
effective, so screening is less necessary.
3. When the disease diagnosed is not destined to 
cause harm i.e. when a disease is present, but not 
destined to cause symptoms, such that diagnosing 
and treating it will cause net harm (the problem known 
as overdiagnosis).27-29 
4. When the population-level risk of the disease is low, 
such that more people will need to be screened to 
save one life and more net harm is likely.4,25 
What should count as a benefit or a harm of screening is 
also not clear. Policymakers, clinicians and citizens have 
different views on what is important.30,25,31 For example, 
some may wish to avoid every cancer death at any 
cost, while others may prioritise avoiding unnecessary 
treatment. Determining whether screening prevents harm 
requires deciding which harms matter, finding data about 
them, and deciding how they should be weighted in 
analysis.  
Cancer screening and psychological wellbeing 
Social marketing about screening commonly suggests 
that screening can provide reassurance that disease is 
absent.32,33 If this correct, a negative screening result may 
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serve the goal of improving psychological wellbeing.2 
However, in population screening, how or when such 
reassurance should count as a benefit is not clear. 
As noted, fear of cancer is common in populations. 
Cancer was historically difficult to treat, and so was 
associated with suffering and death. Even after significant 
improvements in treatment, cancers are leading causes of 
death in middle age in Australia and directly experienced 
by many, so some fear of cancer is not unreasonable.34,35 
However, fear or anxiety may also arise from public health 
communication campaigns designed to encourage people 
toward screening or other health behaviour change.36,37 
That is, at least some anxiety about cancer may effectively 
be iatrogenic. If this is the case, it seems dubious to 
count the relief of this anxiety as a benefit of a screening 
program. In addition, screening itself produces some 
psychological harms. False positives in particular, which 
cumulate across a lifetime of participation,38 have been 
shown to have lasting detrimental effects on psychological 
wellbeing of a similar magnitude to a cancer diagnosis.39 
Supporting autonomy in screening 
Screening can, in itself, promote or support autonomy 
by providing information.2 On the surface, this seems 
relatively straightforward. A person enters screening 
knowing little about their cancer risk, and exits knowing 
a great deal more. There are certainly situations in which 
this will allow people to make better decisions about their 
health care, consistent with their own values. 
However, communication within screening programs also 
has the potential to undermine autonomy.40 Screening 
communication and social marketing sometimes seems 
designed to secure high participation rates - even to 
coerce participation - rather than support autonomy.33,41 
Information is often incomplete because harms are rarely 
described and relative instead of absolute risks are often 
used.26,33,36,42-44 Relative risks are known to discount harms 
and inflate benefits in people’s perceptions, and such 
systematic biasing of people’s perceptions has been 
criticised as a form of unethical manipulation.45 System 
incentives for high screening rates including performance 
payments and key performance indicators may encourage 
this bias.25,33,46 Concern has also been expressed that 
screening communications that emphasise a responsibility 
to screen may make people who decide to refuse 
screening feel guilty.37 
A more ethically justifiable screening program might 
focus on improving people’s understanding of why they 
might choose to screen, preserving voluntariness, rather 
than pushing people towards participation.19,25,47 Empirical 
work shows that people choose differently when they are 
better informed;48 informed choosing may also improve 
psychological wellbeing by increasing people’s sense 
of mastery and self-authorisation.49 The benefit-harm 
trade-offs of screening are complex. Supporting people 
to understand them is no small task and understanding 
should not be assumed.43,50 Sustaining valid consent to 
screen may require re-contacting people at intervals, 
offering opportunities to reconsider prior decisions and 
be informed about changes to screening practices and 
evidence.50 While some have argued against providing 
citizens with quantitative information about screening 
on the grounds that they cannot understand it,51 this is 
difficult to justify, and is inconsistent with what informed 
citizens consider reasonable.52 Particular care needs to 
be taken however, when working with people who are 
educationally or socioeconomically disadvantaged,49 and 
work is ongoing regarding the provision of appropriate 
decision assistance to people with limited literacy and 
numeracy.53,54 
Other relevant ethical considerations 
Screening programs carry large opportunity costs because 
they are expensive to run well, so it is important to 
periodically assess whether they are providing adequate 
health benefit and/or improvements in health equity to 
justify that cost.23,26,29,55 Concern has been expressed 
that screening may divert funding away from forms of 
primary prevention that would have a larger effect on all-
cause mortality and morbidity,56 or away from providing 
necessary care to those who are acutely ill.57-59
Financial strain is a particular problem in user-pays health 
systems, where cancer can readily cause bankruptcy. In 
some user-pays health systems, people may receive a 
positive screening result from a free screening service, 
and then not be able to access affordable treatment.60,61 
Conversely, unregulated private fee-for-service screening 
can generate large cost burdens for public or insurance-
funded follow-up services.29 Knowing that one is at high 
risk of developing cancer may, in some contexts, make 
one less employable or insurable.62 This is just one reason 
why confidentiality and privacy are important ethical 
issues for screening programs.47
Screening tends to have differential uptake among 
people of higher and lower socioeconomic status 
and people from different cultural backgrounds.49 An 
ethical judgement about this depends on whether or 
not it is considered to be in people’s best interests 
to participate in a particular kind of screening. It also 
depends on how justice is conceived. For example, 
if screening programs aim to provide the greatest 
possible health improvement for the least well off, they 
will be designed very differently than if they are intended 
to achieve the largest and most efficient improvement in 
aggregated population health.49 
As with any health service, there are important issues 
to consider regarding how best to involve, and be 
accountable to, communities,34 and how to ensure that 
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Does cancer screening serve individual or 
common interests?  
Decisions about whether screening serves the interests 
of a population are distinct from decisions about whether 
screening serves the interests of a particular individual.5,25,64 
It is not yet clear how to balance these distinct population 
and individual-level dimensions of screening activities.2,41,65 
There are advantages to a public approach to screening, 
particularly in ensuring standardisation and quality 
in service provision. However, from a more individual 
perspective, to coerce or manipulate citizens to subject 
themselves to invasive procedures for the sake of 
achieving a participation target, or changing a population-
level mortality statistic, seems questionable. Different 
individuals have different goals and values, and so will - if 
they understand an offer of screening - make different 
choices. Even expert policymakers disagree on what 
the goals of screening should be, and so what values 
should be prioritised in decision making.66 Anya Plutynski 
summed up the tension this way: 
“Although a narrow utilitarian or expected utility perspective 
might simply attach values to lives saved, and so use 
any strategy (including representing risk deceptively, or 
discounting or hiding cost to patients due to unnecessary 
biopsies or overdiagnosis), there are broader issues 
at stake. Questions of risk and benefit need to be 
supplemented by some discussion of the reasonable 
variability in values patients attach to different risks, the 
norms of clinician-patient relationships, and what respect 
for autonomy and informed consent requires. Questions 
about risk and benefit can be better answered once 
we know how sensitive or specific are our screening 
tools, how prevalent the disease, and thus what the 
risks are of false positives. However, we also need to 
assess the values behind general versus individually 
tailored recommendations, and arguments for and against 
individual consultation with clinicians, versus general 
recommendations that may benefit some, but not most 
patients.”25
The literature regarding the ethics of cancer screening 
is relatively new, and still in development. This review 
suggests that there are at least two central questions that 
need resolution if the field is to advance. The first is to 
determine how the competing potential goals of screening 
should be prioritised and balanced against one another. 
The second related question is the extent to which cancer 
screening is an individual clinical service, to which the 
principles of clinical ethics apply, and/or a public health 
service, to which the principles of public health ethics 
apply. These questions provide important challenges to 
future research on the ethics of cancer screening.  
Acknowledgments 
This work was funded by NHMRC Project Grant 1023197 
and the author was supported by NHMRC Career 
Development Fellowship 1032963. Sincere thanks to the 
project grant team on 1023197 for four years of fruitful 
discussion, analysis, provocation and hard work - Prof 
Alexandra Barratt, Assoc Prof Lucie Rychetnik, Dr Chris 
Degeling, Lisa Parker, Jane Williams, Kristen Pickles and 
Gemma Jacklyn.
References
1. Wilson JMG, Jungner G. Principles and practice of screening for disease. 
Geneva: World Health Organisation, 1968.
2. Juth N, Munthe C. The Ethics of Screening in Health Care and Medicine: 
Serving Society or Serving the Patient?: Springer; 2012.
3. Chan ECY. Promoting an ethical approach to unproven screening imaging 
tests. Journal of the American College of Radiology. 2005;2(4):311-20.
4. Carter SM, Williams J, Parker L, et al. Screening for Cervical, Prostate, and 
Breast Cancer. Am J Prev Med. 2015;49(2):274–85.
5. Burger IM, Kass NE. Screening in the Dark: Ethical Considerations of Providing 
Screening Tests to Individuals When Evidence is Insufficient to Support 
Screening Populations. Am J Bioeth. 2009;9(4):3-14.
6. Borland R, Donaghue N, Hill D. Illnesses that Australians most feared in 1986 
and 1993. Aust J Public Health. 1994;18(4):366-9.
7. Lee V, Loiselle CG. The salience of existential concerns across the cancer 
control continuum. Palliat Support Care. 2012;10(2):123-33.
8. Lupton D. Femininity, responsibility, and the technological imperative - 
discourses on breast-cancer in the Australian press. Int J Health Serv. 
1994;24(1):73-89.
9. Hofmann B. Is there a technological imperative in health care? Int J Technol 
Assess Health Care. 2002;18(3):675-89.
10. Schwartz LM, Woloshin S, Fowler FJ, et al. Enthusiasm for cancer screening 
in the United States. Jama-Journal of the American Medical Association. 
2004;291(1):71-8.
11. Livingston P, Wakefield M, Elwood JM. Community attitudes towards the 
early detection of cancer in Victoria, Australia. Aust N Z J Public Health. 
2007;31(1):26-9.
12. Williams JH, Carter SM, Rychetnik L. ‘Organised’ cervical screening 45 
years on: How consistent are organised screening practices? Eur J Cancer. 
2014;50(17):3029-38.
13. Verweij M, Dawson A. The meaning of ‘public’ in ‘public health’. In: Dawson 
A, Verweij M, editors. Ethics, prevention and public health. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2007:13-29.
14. Kass NE. An ethics framework for public health. Am J Public Health. 
2001;91(11):1776-82.
15. Kass NE. Public health ethics: From foundations and frameworks to justice and 
global public health. Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics. 2004;32(2):232-42.
16. Wilson J. Towards a normative framework for public health ethics and policy. 
Public Health Ethics. 2009;2(2):184.
17. Upshur REG. Principles for the justification of public health intervention. Can J 
Public Health. 2002;93(2):101-3.
18. Childress JF, Faden RR, Gaare RD, et al. Public health ethics: Mapping the 
terrain. Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics. 2002;30(2):170-8.
19. Entwistle VA, Carter SM, Trevena L, et al. Communicating about screening. Br 
Med J. 2008;337(7673):3.
20. Entwistle VA, Carter SM, Cribb A, et al. Supporting patient autonomy: the 
importance of clinician-patient relationships. J Gen Intern Med. 2010;Jul 
25(7):741-5.
21. Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press USA; 2008.
22. Australian Government: Department of Health. Cancer Screening. 2015 [cited 
2015 Dec 4]; Available from: http://www.cancerscreening.gov.au/.
23. Harris RP, Sheridan SL, Lewis CL, et al. The harms of screening: A proposed 
taxonomy and application to lung cancer screening. JAMA Internal Medicine. 
2014;174(2):281-6.
24. Hersch J, Jansen J, Barratt A, et al. Women’s views on overdiagnosis in breast 
cancer screening: a qualitative study. BMJ. 2013;346.




26. Delatycki MB. The ethics of screening for disease. Pathology. 
2012;44(2):63-8.
27. Carter SM, Rogers W, Heath I, et al. The challenge of overdiagnosis begins 
with its definition. BMJ. 2015;350:doi 10.1136/bmj.h869.
28. Marcus PM, Prorok PC, Miller AB, et al. Conceptualizing Overdiagnosis in 
Cancer Screening. J Natl Cancer Inst. 2015;107(4).
29. Hillman BJ. Economic, legal, and ethical rationales for the ACRIN National 
Lung Screening Trial of CT screening for lung cancer. Acad Radiol. 
2003;10(3):349-50.
30. Parker L, Rychetnik L, Carter S. Values in breast cancer screening: an 
empirical study with Australian experts. BMJ Open. 2015;5(5).
31. Pickles K, Carter SM, Rychetnik L. Doctors’ approaches to PSA testing 
and overdiagnosis in primary healthcare: a qualitative study. BMJ open. 
2015;5(3):e006367.
32. Cantor SB, Volk RJ, Cass AR, et al. Psychological benefits of 
prostate cancer screening: the role of reassurance. Health Expect. 
2002;5(2):104-13.
33. Williams JH, Carter SM, Rychetnik L. Information provision in cervical 
screening in Australia. Med J Aust. 2014;201(5):295-7.
34. Philips BU, Chambers DL, Whiting LH, et al. Ethical issues in community-
based cancer control: Considerations in designing interventions. Fam 
Community Health. 2001;23(4):62-74.
35. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Leading causes of death. 
Canberra: AIHW; 2015 [cited 2015 Dec 11]; Available from: http://www.
aihw.gov.au/deaths/leading-causes-of-death/.
36. Jørgensen KJ, Gøtzsche PC. Content of invitations for publicly 
funded screening mammography. BMJ : British Medical Journal. 
2006;332(7540):538-41.
37. van Dam L, Bretthauer M. Ethical issues in colorectal cancer screening. 
Best Pract Res Clin Gastroenterol. 2014;28(2):315-26.
38. Elmore JG, Barton MB, Moceri VM, et al. Ten-Year Risk of False Positive 
Screening Mammograms and Clinical Breast Examinations. N Engl J Med. 
1998;338(16):1089-96.
39. Brodersen J, Siersma VD. Long-Term Psychosocial Consequences of 
False-Positive Screening Mammography. The Annals of Family Medicine. 
2013;11(2):106-15.
40. Parker LM, Rychetnik L, Carter SM. The role of communication in breast 
cancer screening: a qualitative study with Australian experts. BMC Cancer. 
2015 15(Oct 19):741.
41. Raffle A, Gray M. Screening: evidence and practice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 2007.
42. Zapka JG, Geller BM, Bulliard J-L, et al. Print information to inform 
decisions about mammography screening participation in 16 countries with 
population-based programs. Patient Educ Couns. 2006;63(1–2):126-37.
43. Schwartz PH, Meslin EM. The ethics of information: Absolute risk 
reduction and patient understanding of screening. J Gen Intern Med. 
2008;23(6):867-70.
44. Breitsameter C. Medical decision-making and communication of risks: an 
ethical perspective. J Med Ethics. 2010;36(6):349-52.
45. Shaw D, Elger B. Evidence-based persuasion: An ethical imperative. 
JAMA. 2013;309(16):1689-90.
46. Womack C, Warren AY. Informed decision making for cancer screening - 
not all of the ethical issues have been considered ... still. Cytopathology. 
2003;14(3):165-6.
47. Haehnel P. Screening: ethical principles. Bull Cancer (Paris). 
2001;88(4):407-10.
48. Hersch J, Barratt A, Jansen J, et al. Use of a decision aid including 
information on overdetection to support informed choice about 
breast cancer screening: a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet. 
2015;385(9978):1642-52.
49. Crockett R, Wilkinson TM, Marteau TM. Social patterning of screening 
uptake and the impact of facilitating informed choices: Psychological and 
ethical analyses. Health Care Anal. 2008;16(1):17-30.
50. Millett C, Parker M. Informed decision making for cancer screening - not all 
of the ethical issues have been considered. Cytopathology. 2003;14(1):3-4.
51. Schwartz PH. Questioning the Quantitative Imperative Decision Aids, Prevention, 
and the Ethics of Disclosure. Hastings Cent Rep. 2011;41(2):30-9.
52. Degeling C, Rychetnik L, Pickles K, et al. What should happen before 
asymptomatic men decide whether or not to have a PSA test? A report on 
three community juries. Med J Aust. 2015;203(8):335.
53. Muscat DM, Morony S, Shepherd HL, et al. Development and field testing 
of a consumer shared decision-making training program for adults with low 
literacy. Patient Educ Couns. 2015;98(10):1180-8.
54. Smith SK, Kearney P, Trevena L, et al. Informed choice in bowel cancer 
screening: a qualitative study to explore how adults with lower education 
use decision aids. Health Expect. 2014;17(4):511-22.
55. Ragupathy R, Menkes DB. Prostate cancer screening and ethical use of 
limited resources. NZ Med J. 2013;126(1385):92-4.
56. Vineis P, Satolli R. From Figures to Values: The Implicit Ethical Judgements 
in our Measures of Health. Public Health Ethics. 2012;5(1):22-8.
57. Heath I. Who needs health care—the well or the sick? BMJ. 
2005;330(7497):954-6.
58. Heath I. Role of fear in overdiagnosis and overtreatment—an essay by Iona 
Heath. BMJ. 2014;349:g6123 
59. Heath I. Overdiagnosis: when good intentions meet vested interests—an 
essay by Iona Heath. BMJ. 2013;347:f6361.
60. Ramsey S, Blough D, Kirchhoff A, et al. Washington State Cancer Patients 
Found To Be At Greater Risk For Bankruptcy Than People Without A 
Cancer Diagnosis. Health Aff. 2013;32(6):1143-52.
61. Mondragon D, Brandon JE. Two major ethical issues in health education 
and promotion: Assessing stage of change and cancer screening. Fam 
Community Health. 2001;23(4):50-61.
62. Jansen LA. Ethical concerns relating to the detection and treatment of 
ovarian cancer. Gynecol Oncol. 2002;84(1):1-3.
63. Zehbe I, Maar M, Nahwegahbow AJ, et al. Ethical Space for a Sensitive 
Research Topic: Engaging First Nations Women in the Development of 
Culturally Safe Human Papillomavirus Screening. Journal of Aboriginal 
Health. 2012;8(1):41-50.
64. Verweij M. Preventive Medicine between Obligation and Aspiration. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2000.
65. Moutel G, Duchange N, Darquy S, et al. Women’s participation in 
breast cancer screening in France - an ethical approach. BMC Medical 
Ethics. 2014;15.
66. Parker L, Rychetnik L, Carter S. Values in breast cancer screening: an 
empirical study with Australian experts. BMJ Open. 2015;5(5):e006333.
